|
|
|
Related
website
Better
English for Filipinos
Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001
May a
Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction
in an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating
to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly
in questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent
to any of the heirs?
An action
for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate
of a deceased person such as advancement of property made
by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules
as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly,
matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate
of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the
probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus,
under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions
as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the
final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.
While
it may be true that the Rules used the word “may”, it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the “court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings”.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant
case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority
to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement
of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the
proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was
not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly
pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.
This Court is not unaware of
our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo
and Mendoza vs. Teh that whether a particular matter should be resolved by
the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate
jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question
of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural question involving
a mode of practice “which may be waived”.
Notwithstanding,
we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents
inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed
the authority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction,
to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the
decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions,
this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle
that although generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties
are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.
Of equal importance is that
before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory
heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be
taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained,
by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the
value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of
his death; then, all donations subject to collation would
be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime
of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation
had prejudiced the legitimes.
Munsayac-De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No. 148597.
October 24, 2003
It should be clear that the
CA Decision terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found
that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the
parties was the “final, complete and absolute settlement of
their respective shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses
Gelacio Munsayac,
Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac.”
As such, any and all incidents relating to the special proceedings
should also be deemed to have been terminated.
When Judge Reyes issued his
Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch
in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box
of petitioners and to deposit certain amounts in custodia
legis, he did so as the presiding
judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings
No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally been terminated,
it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right
to hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders
in the special proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting
of any freeze order and the return of any property previously
deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had
no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and
the property deposited should be released. Likewise,
any standing order on any property
in relation to the special proceedings should be lifted.
This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a
tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction.
However, the determination of whether a property should be
included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction.
Such determination is only provisional -- not conclusive --
in character and subject to the final decision in a separate
action that may be instituted by the parties.
Neither are we unmindful of
the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly made
by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by
the court that has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings;
and that the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heirs.
In a train of decisions, this
Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary
principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question
of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested
parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation
or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of
jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
These principles, however, have no more application in this
case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been
decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation
must come to an end.
To be sure, this Court is not
tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited
with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress
of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so
now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated
by the legal heirs of the Munsayac
spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have
already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing
the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares
as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply
the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property
originally deposited by petitioners in custodia
legis.
Vda de Daffon vs. CA
G.R. No. 129017.
August 20, 2002
Petitioner Concepcion
Villamor was married to the late
Amado Daffon,
with whom she begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito
married Lourdes Osmeña, and they
bore six children, namely, Aileen, Joselito
Jr., Ana Vanesa, Leila, Julius and
Suzette.
Amado passed away on January
21, 1982. His son, Joselito, died on October
25, 1990.
On January
21, 1994, respondents Lourdes Osmeña Vda. De Daffon, together with her six minor children, instituted an
action for partition against petitioner Concepcion
Villamor Vda. de
Daffon, which case was docketed
as Civil Case No. DNA-281 of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25. Respondents alleged
that Amado left several real and
personal properties which formed part of his conjugal partnership
with petitioner. Joselito being a forced heir of Amado
was entitled to at least one half of Amado’s
estate, consisting of his share in the said conjugal properties.
However, the said properties were never partitioned between
petitioner and Joselito. After
Joselito’s death, petitioner’s behavior
towards respondents, her daughter-in-law and grandchildren,
changed. She claimed absolute ownership over all the properties
and deprived them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents
prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado
Daffon and petitioner be partitioned
and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned between petitioner, on one hand,
and the respondents as heirs of Joselito
Daffon, on the other hand.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case; (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action; and (3) waiver, abandonment and extinguishment
of the obligation. She argued that the trial court cannot
take cognizance of the action for partition considering her
claim of absolute ownership over the properties; and that
respondents themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated
the co-ownership. Anent the third ground, petitioner alleged
that Joselito Daffon
filed a complaint against Milagros Marin, who was likewise
married to Amado Daffon, for recovery of a
parcel of land in Mandaluyong. In said complaint, respondent
Lourdes Osmeña Vda. de
Daffon allegedly admitted that the
land sought was the only property of the late Amado
Daffon.
In an Order dated July
22, 1994, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied on
September 23, 1994.
On October
25, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35536. On November
14, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
denying due course and dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in the
Resolution dated April
21, 1997.
There is no merit in the petition.
It should be stressed that in the determination
of whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, only
the statements in the complaint may be properly considered.
Moreover, a defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on
the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits
all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the
facts found in a complaint as constituting a cause of action
is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the
relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint
and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants.
In the case at bar, the complaint sufficiently
alleged that “defendant (i.e., petitioner herein) was
married to Amado Quiros
Daffon” and that “they begot an only son in Joselito Daffon.” The complaint
further alleged that “Joselito Daffon
later got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes Osmeña
and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six (6) children who are now plaintiffs
with their mother.” This, to our mind, was sufficient allegation
that Joselito Daffon was a legitimate
son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion
Daffon; and that plaintiffs (i.e.,
respondents herein) were likewise legitimate heirs of Joselito
Daffon. Admitting the truth of these averments, there was,
therefore, no need to inquire whether respondent minor children
were duly acknowledged by the deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy
of the said children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters
which petitioner may raise as a defense in her answer and threshed out by the court
during a full-blown trial.
In the same vein,
there is no need for the complaint to specifically allege
respondents’ claim of co-ownership of the properties. The
complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts on which
the plaintiffs rely for their claim.
The rules of procedure
require that the complaint must make a concise statement of
the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot
be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause
of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action
only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach
of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
The allegations contained
therein are sufficient to establish respondents’ right to
the estate of Amado Daffon.
By stating their relationship to the deceased, they established
their line of succession as the basis for their claim. Their
rights to succeed as heirs were transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent.
Contrary to petitioner’s
contention, the fact that she repudiated the co-ownership
between her and respondents did not deprive the trial court
of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition.
In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first,
a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject properties;
and second, the conveyance of his lawful shares. As the Court
of Appeals correctly held, an action for partition is at once
an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. If the defendant asserts exclusive title over the
property, the action for partition should not be dismissed.
Rather, the court should resolve the case and if the plaintiff
is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-owner, the
court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong remedy
was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring
the defendant to submit to partition. If, on the other hand,
the court after trial should find the existence of co-ownership
among the parties, the court may and should order the partition
of the properties in the same action.
An action for partition
is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition
which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and
whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming
the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the
commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be.
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken
up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership
in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed)
and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration
that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition
is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question
is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they
are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon.
Petitioner insists that in her testimony
given in Civil Case No. 56336, respondent Lourdes Daffon
admitted that the land in Mandaluyong was the only property
left by the deceased Amado Daffon.
We do not agree with petitioner’s interpretation
of the above phrase. The foregoing statement, saying that
the deceased only left the said Mandaluyong property to his
son Joselito, does not exclude the
possibility that Amado owned other
land and personal belongings during his lifetime, which he
may not have left to his son. This does not deprive Joselito
or his successors-in-interest of the right to share in those
other properties. As a matter of fact, respondents’ complaint
contains a long list of properties allegedly owned by Amado Daffon. Again, the resolution
of whether or not these belonged to Amado
Daffon and formed part of his estate is a matter best taken
up during trial and after an evaluation of the evidence to
be presented by the contending parties.
Petitioner argues that the order which denied
the Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order which is not
appealable. Hence, it may be the subject of a special civil
action for certiorari. However, for certiorari to lie, it
must be convincingly proved that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation
of law; or that the trial court exercised its power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal
hostility. In the case at bar, the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion to
Dismiss. Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing
the petition for certiorari.
We are indeed distressed by the circumstances
under which the instant case reached this Court. Instead
of filing an answer and meeting the issues head-on, petitioner
and her counsel chose to elevate the incident of the denial
of the Motion to Dismiss to the higher courts. In doing so,
they effectively delayed the resolution of the case and the
adjudication of the respective rights of the parties by the
court below. What makes this case more reprehensible is that
petitioner abused the legal process to delay her own grandchildren’s
expectancy to share in the estate left by their father and
grandfather. If there is any merit in her claim of absolute
ownership over the contested properties, she could have just
allowed the case to be fully tried, during which she should
have proved her case with competent proof. While litigants
may utilize all available means to defend themselves, the
legal strategies they employ should not amount to machinations
which frustrate and prejudice the rights of others. Moreover,
frivolous appeals, such as the one filed in this case, are
not countenanced in this jurisdiction.
How
to become a Christian
Roman
Road
the
Kristo
The
Cross
Knowing
God Personally
Power
To Change
Have
you ever asked yourself ...
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Republic Act No. 386
The Civil Code of the Philippines
Chapter
4. Provisions Common To Testate and Intestate Successions
Note: To get to
the article you want, click the Chapter, Section and Subsection
headings.
Section 1 Right of Accretion
Article 1015 Definition of accretion
Article 1016 Requisites for accretion
Article 1017 Meaning of “one half
for each” or “in equal shares”
Article 1018 Share of person who
repudiates inheritance accrues to co-heirs
Article 1019 Proportional shares
by heirs who received property by accretion
Article 1020 Succession to all rights and obligations
of person who renounced
or could not inherit
Article 1021 Accretion among compulsory
heirs
Article 1022 When accretion does
not take place
Article 1023 Accretion among devisees,
legatees ands usufructuaries
Section 2 Capacity to Succeed
by Will or by Intestacy
Article 1024 Who may succeed
Article 1025 Requisites for capacity
to succeed
Article 1026 Dispositions in favor of the State, local
government units, corporations,
organization or associations
Article 1027 Parties absolutely
incapable of succeeding
Article 1028 Prohibitions in donations inter vivos
applicable to testamentary
dispositions
Article 1029 Dispositions for prayers and pious works;
share of church or
denomination, and the State
Article 1030 Testamentary provisions
for the poor
Article 1031 Testamentary provision
for disqualified person void
Article 1032 Persons disqualified
to succeed due to unworthiness
Article 1033 Effect of condonation
on causes of unworthiness
Article 1034 Criterion to judge
capacity of heir, devisee or legatee
Article 1035 Right of child or descendant to succeed
person excluded from
inheritance
Article 1036 Alienations and acts
of administration by excluded heir
Article 1037 Indemnity for unworthy heir in expenses
for preservation of hereditary
property
Article 1038 Liability of person incapable of succession
who enters into
possession of hereditary property
Article 1039 Capacity to succeed
governed by decedent’s national law
Article 1040 When to bring action
for declaration of incapacity
Section 3 Acceptance and
Repudiation of the Inheritance
Article 1041 Freedom to accept
or repudiate inheritance
Article 1042 Retroactive effect
of acceptance or repudiation
Article 1043 Acceptance or repudiation only upon certainty
of death or of
right to inherit
Article 1044 Who may accept or
repudiate an inheritance
Article 1045 Acceptance or repudiation
by corporation, associations, etc.
Article 1046 Acceptance or repudiation
by public official establishments
Article 1047 Repudiation by married
woman
Article 1048 Acceptance or repudiation
by deaf-mute
Article 1049 Acceptance either
express or tacit
Article 1050 How inheritance is
deemed accepted
Article 1051 Repudiation in public
or authentic instrument, or court petition
Article 1052 Right of creditors
against party who repudiates inheritance
Article 1053 Transmission of right
to accept or repudiate
Article 1054 Freedom of several
heirs to either accept or repudiate inheritance
Article 1055 Repudiation by a person who is both intestate
and testamentary
heir
Article 1056 Acceptance or repudiation
of inheritance irrevocable; exception
Article 1057 Period to signify
to the court of acceptance or repudiation
Section 4 Executors and
Administrators
Article 1058 Rules of Court govern
all matters
Article 1059 If assets of decedent’s
estate not enough to pay debts
Article 1060 Trust company as
executor or administrator
Section 5 Collation
Article 1061 Definition of collation;
obligation of compulsory heirs
Article 1062 When collation does
not take place
Article 1063 Property left by will not subject to
collation; no impairment of
legitime
Article 1064 Obligations of grandchildren who survive
with uncles, aunts or
cousins
Article 1065 Donations to grandchildren,
not subject to collation
Article 1066 Donations to spouse
of a child
Article 1067 Expenses for support, education, medical
assistance, etc not
subject to collation
Article 1068 Expenses incurred
by parents for children, when subject to collation
Article 1069 Payments by parents
of children’s debts subject to collation
Article 1070 Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants
not to exceed one
tenth of sum disposable by will
Article 1071 Donation’s value taken at time of donation;
increase or deterioration,
total loss or destruction
Article 1072 Collation of donation
by both parents
Article 1073 Proportion s in shares of donee
and co-heirs; same nature,
class and quality
Article 1074 When Art. 1073 not
practicable
Article 1075 Fruits and interests of property subject
to collation on day the
succession opens
Article 1076 Reimbursement to
donee by co-heirs for necessary expenses
Article 1077 Distribution of estate
not interrupted on questions of collation
Section 6 Partition and
Distribution of the Estate
Subsection
1. Partition
Article 1078 Whole estate owned
in common before partition
Article 1079 Definition of partition
Article 1080 Partition of estate
inter vivos or by will
Article 1081 Power to partition when given to any
person who is not one of
the co-heirs
Article 1082 Acts to end indivision
among co-heirs
Article 1083 Co-heir’s rights
to demand division
Article 1084 When voluntary heirs
cannot demand partition
Article 1085 Equality in partition
of the estate
Article 1086 When thing is indivisible or would be
much impaired by being
divided
Article 1087 Reimbursement by
co-heirs for useful and necessary expenses
Article 1088 Sale by heir of his rights to a stranger
Article 1089 Delivery of titles
of acquisition or ownership
Article 1090 Delivery of title comprising two or more
pieces of land assigned
to two or more co-heirs
Subsection 2 Effects of
Partition
Article 1091 Legal partition confers
exclusive ownership upon each heir
Article 1092 Co-heirs reciprocally
bound to warrant tile
Article 1093 reciprocal obligation of warranty proportionate
to respective
shares of co-heirs
Article 1094 Period to bring action
enforcing warranty
Article 1095 When co-heirs liable
for subsequent insolvency of estate’s debtor
Article 1096 When obligation of
warranty among co-heirs ceases
Subsection 3 Rescission
and Nullity of Partition
Article 1097 Causes for rescission
and nullity of partition
Article 1098 Partition rescinded
because of lesion
Article 1099 Partition by testator cannot be impugned
on ground of lesion;
exception
Article 1100 Prescription of action
for rescission on account of lesion
Article 1101 Option of heir who
is sued
Article 1102 When heir cannot
sue for rescission on ground of lesion
Article 1103 Effect of omission of one or more objects
or securities of the
inheritance
Article 1104 When partition made
with preterition
Article 1105 Effect of partition
which included a non-heir
Section 1.
- Right of Accretion
Art. 1015.
Accretion is a right by virtue of which, when two or more persons
are called to the same inheritance, devise or legacy, the part assigned
to the one who renounces or cannot receive his share, or who died
before the testator, is added or incorporated to that of his co-heirs,
co-devisees, or co-legatees. (n)
Art. 1016.
In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary
succession, it shall be necessary:
(1) That two or more persons
be called to the same inheritance, or to the same portion thereof,
pro indiviso; and
(2) That one of the persons thus
called die before the testator, or renounce the inheritance, or
be incapacitated to receive it. (928a)
Art. 1017.
The words "one-half for each" or "in equal shares"
or any others which, though designating an aliquot part, do not
identify it by such description as shall make each heir the exclusive
owner of determinate property, shall not exclude the right of accretion.
In case of money or fungible goods,
if the share of each heir is not earmarked, there shall be a right
of accretion. (983a)
Art. 1018.
In legal succession the share of the person who repudiates the inheritance
shall always accrue to his co-heirs. (981)
Art. 1019.
The heirs to whom the portion goes by the right of accretion take
it in the same proportion that they inherit. (n)
Art. 1020.
The heirs to whom the inheritance accrues shall succeed to all the
rights and obligations which the heir who renounced or could not
receive it would have had. (984)
Art. 1021.
Among the compulsory heirs the right of accretion shall take place
only when the free portion is left to two or more of them, or to
any one of them and to a stranger.
Should the part repudiated be the
legitime, the other co-heirs shall succeed
to it in their own right, and not by the right of accretion. (985)
Art. 1022.
In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not
take place, the vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute
has been designated, shall pass to the legal heirs of the testator,
who shall receive it with the same charges and obligations. (986)
Art. 1023.
Accretion shall also take place among devisees, legatees and usufructuaries under the same conditions established for heirs.
(987a)
Section 2.
- Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
Art. 1024.
Persons not incapacitated by law may succeed by will or ab
intestato.
The provisions relating to incapacity
by will are equally applicable to intestate succession. (744, 914)
Art. 1025.
In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee
must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case
of representation, when it is proper.
A child already conceived at the
time of the death of the decedent is capable of succeeding provided
it be born later under the conditions prescribed in Article 41.
(n)
Art. 1026.
A testamentary disposition may be made to the State, provinces,
municipal corporations, private corporations, organizations, or
associations for religious, scientific, cultural, educational, or
charitable purposes.
All other corporations or entities
may succeed under a will, unless there is a provision to the contrary
in their charter or the laws of their creation, and always subject
to the same. (746a)
Art. 1027.
The following are incapable of succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the
confession of the testator during his last illness, or the minister
of the gospel who extended spiritual aid to him during the same
period;
(2) The relatives of such priest
or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the church,
order, chapter, community, organization, or institution to which
such priest or minister may belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to
testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his favor before
the final accounts of the guardianship have been approved, even
if the testator should die after the approval thereof; nevertheless,
any provision made by the ward in favor of the guardian when the
latter is his ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or spouse,
shall be valid;
(4) Any attesting witness to
the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or children, or
any one claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or children;
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse,
health officer or druggist who took care of the testator during
his last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations
and corporations not permitted by law to inherit. (745, 752, 753,
754a)
Art. 1028.
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations
inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. (n)
Art. 1029.
Should the testator dispose of the whole or part of his property
for prayers and pious works for the benefit of his soul, in general
terms and without specifying its application, the executor, with
the court's approval shall deliver one-half thereof or its proceeds
to the church or denomination to which the testator may belong,
to be used for such prayers and pious works, and the other half
to the State, for the purposes mentioned in Article
1013. (747a)
Art. 1030.
Testamentary provisions in favor of the poor in general, without
designation of particular persons or of any community, shall be
deemed limited to the poor living in the domicile of the testator
at the time of his death, unless it should clearly appear that his
intention was otherwise.
The designation of the persons
who are to be considered as poor and the distribution of the property
shall be made by the person appointed by the testator for the purpose;
in default of such person, by the executor, and should there be
no executor, by the justice of the peace, the mayor, and the municipal
treasurer, who shall decide by a majority of votes all questions
that may arise. In all these cases, the approval of the Court of
First Instance shall be necessary.
The preceding paragraph shall apply
when the testator has disposed of his property in favor of the poor
of a definite locality. (749a)
Art. 1031.
A testamentary provision in favor of a disqualified person, even
though made under the guise of an onerous contract, or made through
an intermediary, shall be void. (755)
Art. 1032.
The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of unworthiness:
(1) Parents who have abandoned
their children or induced their daughters to lead a corrupt or
immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) Any person who has been convicted
of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse,
descendants, or ascendants;
(3) Any person who has accused
the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment
for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who,
having knowledge of the violent death of the testator, should
fail to report it to an officer of the law within a month, unless
the authorities have already taken action; this prohibition shall
not apply to cases wherein, according to law, there is no obligation
to make an accusation;
(5) Any person convicted of adultery
or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;
(6) Any person who by fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence should cause the testator
to make a will or to change one already made;
(7) Any person who by the same
means prevents another from making a will, or from revoking one
already made, or who supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's
will;
(8) Any person who falsifies
or forges a supposed will of the decedent. (756, 673, 674a)
Art. 1033.
The cause of unworthiness shall be without effect if the testator
had knowledge thereof at the time he made the will, or if, having
known of them subsequently, he should condone them in writing. (757a)
Art. 1034.
In order to judge the capacity of the heir, devisee or legatee,
his qualification at the time of the death of the decedent shall
be the criterion.
In cases falling under Nos. 2,
3, or 5 of Article 1032, it shall be necessary to wait until final
judgment is rendered, and in the case falling under No. 4, the expiration
of the month allowed for the report.
If the institution, devise or legacy
should be conditional, the time of the compliance with the condition
shall also be considered. (758a)
Art. 1035.
If the person excluded from the inheritance by reason of incapacity
should be a child or descendant of the decedent and should have
children or descendants, the latter shall acquire his right to the
legitime.
The person so excluded shall not
enjoy the usufruct and administration of the property thus inherited
by his children. (761a)
Art. 1036.
Alienations of hereditary property, and acts of administration performed
by the excluded heir, before the judicial order of exclusion, are
valid as to the third persons who acted in good faith; but the co-heirs
shall have a right to recover damages from the disqualified heir.
(n)
Art. 1037.
The unworthy heir who is excluded from the succession has a right
to demand indemnity or any expenses incurred in the preservation
of the hereditary property, and to enforce such credits as he may
have against the estate. (n)
Art. 1038.
Any person incapable of succession, who, disregarding the prohibition
stated in the preceding articles, entered into the possession of
the hereditary property, shall be obliged to return it together
with its accessions.
He shall be liable for all the
fruits and rents he may have received, or could have received through
the exercise of due diligence. (760a)
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent. (n)
Art. 1040.
The action for a declaration of incapacity and for the recovery
of the inheritance, devise or legacy shall be brought within five
years from the time the disqualified person took possession thereof.
It may be brought by any one who may have an interest in the succession.
(762a)
Back to top
Section
3. - Acceptance
and Repudiation of the Inheritance
Art. 1041.
The acceptance or repudiation of the inheritance is an act which
is purely voluntary and free. (988)
Art. 1042.
The effects of the acceptance or repudiation shall always retroact
to the moment of the death of the decedent. (989)
Art. 1043.
No person may accept or repudiate an inheritance unless he is certain
of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his
right to the inheritance. (991)
Art. 1044.
Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors
or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians.
Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance
left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator
to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in
their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (992a)
Art. 1045.
The lawful representatives of corporations, associations, institutions
and entities qualified to acquire property may accept any inheritance
left to the latter, but in order to repudiate it, the approval of
the court shall be necessary. (993a)
Art. 1046.
Public official establishments can neither accept nor repudiate
an inheritance without the approval of the government. (994)
Art. 1047.
A
married woman of age may repudiate an inheritance without the consent
of her husband. (995a)
Art. 1048.
Deaf-mutes who can read and write may accept or repudiate the inheritance
personally or through an agent. Should they not be able to read
and write, the inheritance shall be accepted by their guardians.
These guardians may repudiate the same with judicial approval. (996a)
Art. 1049.
Acceptance may be express or tacit.
An express acceptance must be made
in a public or private document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting
from acts by which the intention to accept is necessarily implied,
or which one would have no right to do except in the capacity of
an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional
administration do not imply an acceptance of the inheritance if,
through such acts, the title or capacity of an heir has not been
assumed. (999a)
Art. 1050.
An inheritance is deemed accepted:
(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to a stranger, or
to his co-heirs, or to any of them;
(2) If the heir renounces the
same, even though gratuitously, for the benefit of one or more
of his co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a
price in favor of all his co-heirs indiscriminately; but if this
renunciation should be gratuitous, and the co-heirs in whose favor
it is made are those upon whom the portion renounced should devolve
by virtue of accretion, the inheritance
shall not be deemed as accepted. (1000)
Art. 1051.
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic
instrument, or by petition presented to the court having jurisdiction
over the testamentary or intestate proceedings. (1008)
Art. 1052.
If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own
creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to
accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the
creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their
credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain
to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom,
in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may belong.
(1001)
Art. 1053.
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the
inheritance his right shall be transmitted to his heirs. (1006)
Art. 1054.
Should there be several heirs called to the inheritance, some of
them may accept and the others may repudiate it. (1007a)
Art. 1055.
If a person, who is called to the same inheritance as an heir by
will and ab intestato, repudiates the inheritance
in his capacity as a testamentary heir, he is understood to have
repudiated it in both capacities.
Should he repudiate it as an intestate
heir, without knowledge of his being a testamentary heir, he may
still accept it in the latter capacity. (1009)
Art. 1056.
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made, is irrevocable,
and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the
causes that vitiate consent, or when an unknown will appears. (997)
Art. 1057.
Within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution
of the estate in accordance with the Rules of Court, the heirs,
devisees and legatees shall signify to the court having jurisdiction
whether they accept or repudiate the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that
time, they are deemed to have accepted the inheritance. (n)
Back to top
Section 4.
- Executors and Administrators
Art. 1058.
All
matters relating to the appointment, powers and duties of executors
and administrators and concerning the administration of estates
of deceased persons shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (n)
Art. 1059.
If the assets of the estate of a decedent which can be applied to
the payment of debts are not sufficient for that purpose, the provisions
of Articles 2239 to 2251 on Preference of Credits shall be observed,
provided that the expenses referred to in Article 2244, No. 8, shall
be those involved in the administration of the decedent's estate.
(n)
Art. 1060.
A corporation or association authorized to conduct the business
of a trust company in the Philippines may be appointed as an executor, administrator, guardian
of an estate, or trustee, in like manner as an individual; but it
shall not be appointed guardian of the person of a ward. (n)
Back to top
Section 5.
- Collation
Art. 1061.
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062.
Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor
should have so expressly provided, or if the donee
should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be
reduced as inofficious. (1036)
Art. 1063.
Property left by will is not deemed subject to collation, if the
testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime
shall in any case remain unimpaired. (1037)
Art. 1064.
When the grandchildren, who survive with their uncles, aunts, or
cousins, inherit from their grandparents in representation of their
father or mother, they shall bring to collation all that their parents,
if alive, would have been obliged to bring, even though such grandchildren
have not inherited the property.
They shall also bring to collation
all that they may have received from the decedent during his lifetime,
unless the testator has provided otherwise, in which case his wishes
must be respected, if the legitime of
the co-heirs is not prejudiced. (1038)
Art. 1065.
Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in the inheritance
of their ascendants any property which may have been donated by
the latter to their children. (1039)
Art. 1066.
Neither shall donations to the spouse of the child be brought to
collation; but if they have been given by the parent to the spouses
jointly, the child shall be obliged to bring to collation one-half
of the thing donated. (1040)
Art. 1067.
Expenses for support, education, medical attendance, even in extraordinary
illness, apprenticeship, ordinary equipment, or customary gifts
are not subject to collation. (1041)
Art. 1068.
Expenses incurred by the parents in giving their children a professional,
vocational or other career shall not be brought to collation unless
the parents so provide, or unless they impair the legitime;
but when their collation is required, the sum which the child would
have spent if he had lived in the house and company of his parents
shall be deducted therefrom. (1042a)
Art. 1069.
Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the debts of his children,
election expenses, fines, and similar expenses shall be brought
to collation. (1043a)
Art. 1070.
Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing,
and outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious
except insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of the sum which is
disposable by will. (1044)
Art. 1071.
The same things donated are not to be brought to collation and partition,
but only their value at the time of the donation, even though their
just value may not then have been assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration
and even their total loss or destruction, be
it accidental or culpable, shall be for the benefit or account and
risk of the donee. (1045a)
Art. 1072.
In the collation of a donation made by both parents, one-half shall
be brought to the inheritance of the father, and the other half,
to that of the mother. That given by one alone shall be brought
to collation in his or her inheritance. (1046a)
Art. 1073.
The donee's share of the estate shall
be reduced by an amount equal to that already received by him; and
his co-heirs shall receive an equivalent, as much as possible, in
property of the same nature, class and quality. (1047)
Art. 1074.
Should the provisions of the preceding article be impracticable,
if the property donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall be entitled
to receive its equivalent in cash or securities, at the rate of
quotation; and should there be neither cash or marketable securities
in the estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary
shall be sold at public auction.
If the property donated was movable,
the co-heirs shall only have a right to select an equivalent of
other personal property of the inheritance at its just price. (1048)
Art. 1075.
The fruits and interest of the property subject to collation shall
not pertain to the estate except from the day on which the succession
is opened.
For the purpose of ascertaining
their amount, the fruits and interest of the property of the estate
of the same kind and quality as that subject to collation shall
be made the standard of assessment. (1049)
Art. 1076.
The co-heirs are bound to reimburse to the donee
the necessary expenses which he has incurred for the preservation
of the property donated to him, though they may not have augmented
its value.
The donee
who collates in kind an immovable which has been given to him must
be reimbursed by his co-heirs for the improvements which have increased
the value of the property, and which exist at the time the partition
is effected.
As to works made on the estate
for the mere pleasure of the donee, no
reimbursement is due him for them; he has, however, the right to
remove them, if he can do so without injuring the estate. (n)
Art. 1077.
Should any question arise among the co-heirs upon the obligation
to bring to collation or as to the things which are subject to collation,
the distribution of the estate shall not be interrupted for this
reason, provided adequate security is given. (1050)
Back to top
Section 6.
- Partition and Distribution of the Estate
Subsection 1. - Partition
Art. 1078.
Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent
is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject
to the payment of debts of the deceased. (n)
Art. 1079.
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment
of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The
thing itself may be divided, or its value. (n)
Art. 1080.
Should a person make partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar
as it does not prejudice the legitime
of the compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of
his or her family, desires to keep any agricultural, industrial,
or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right
granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime
of the other children to whom the property is not assigned, be paid
in cash. (1056a)
Art. 1081.
A person may, by an act inter vivos or
mortis causa, intrust the mere power to
make the partition after his death to any person who is not one
of the co-heirs.
The provisions of this and of the
preceding article shall be observed even should there be among the
co-heirs a minor or a person subject to guardianship; but the mandatary, in such case, shall make an inventory of the property
of the estate, after notifying the co-heirs, the creditors, and
the legatees or devisees. (1057a)
Art. 1082.
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, and exchange, a compromise,
or any other transaction. (n)
Art. 1083.
Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of the estate unless
the testator should have expressly forbidden its partition, in which
case the period of indivision shall not
exceed twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power of the
testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator,
the co-ownership terminates when any of the causes for which partnership
is dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling
reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of
the co-heirs. (1051a)
Art. 1084.
Voluntary heirs upon whom some condition has been imposed cannot
demand a partition until the condition has been fulfilled; but the
other co-heirs may demand it by giving sufficient security for the
rights which the former may have in case the condition should be
complied with, and until it is known that the condition has not
been fulfilled or can never be complied with, the partition shall
be understood to be provisional. (1054a)
Art. 1085.
In the partition of the estate, equality shall be observed as far
as possible, dividing the property into lots, or assigning to each
of the co-heirs things of the same nature, quality and kind. (1061)
Art. 1086.
Should a thing be indivisible, or would be much impaired by its
being divided, it may be adjudicated to one of the heirs, provided
he shall pay the others the excess in cash.
Nevertheless, if any of the heirs
should demand that the thing be sold at public auction and that
strangers be allowed to bid, this must be done. (1062)
Art. 1087.
In the partition the co-heirs shall reimburse one another for the
income and fruits which each one of them may have received from
any property of the estate, for any useful and necessary expenses
made upon such property, and for any damage thereto through malice
or neglect. (1063)
Art. 1088.
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated
to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price
of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
(1067a)
Art. 1089.
The titles of acquisition or ownership of each property shall be
delivered to the co-heir to whom said property
has been adjudicated. (1065a)
Art. 1090.
When the title comprises two or more pieces of land which have been
assigned to two or more co-heirs, or when it covers one piece of
land which has been divided between two or more co-heirs, the title
shall be delivered to the one having the largest interest, and authentic
copies of the title shall be furnished to the other co-heirs at
the expense of the estate. If the interest of each co-heir should
be the same, the oldest shall have the title. (1066a)
Subsection 2. - Effects
of Partition
Art. 1091.
A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership
of the property adjudicated to him. (1068)
Art. 1092.
After the partition has been made, the co-heirs shall be reciprocally
bound to warrant the title to, and the quality of, each property
adjudicated. (1069a)
Art. 1093.
The reciprocal obligation of warranty referred to in the preceding
article shall be proportionate to the respective hereditary shares
of the co-heirs, but if any one of them should be insolvent, the
other co-heirs shall be liable for his part in the same proportion,
deducting the part corresponding to the one who should be indemnified.
Those who pay fo |
